I identify the causal effect of political connections on the private equity investments of U.S. public pension funds. Exploiting close gubernatorial elections as an identification strategy, I document that politically connected fund managers distort asset allocation decisions, reducing returns for pension beneficiaries. The findings illuminate agency problems in the governance of public retirement systems and the broader role of political economy frictions in institutional investor behavior.

I identify a channel through which distrust spills over from investment advisory firms involved in misconduct to their affiliated bank branches. Clients who experience adviser misconduct significantly reduce their engagement with affiliated banking services, documenting a novel within-conglomerate contagion mechanism and its implications for the organization of financial services firms.

I identify a systemic pattern of inferior investment decisions made by asset management firms in the 401(k) pension business due to conflicts of interest with corporate clients. Business ties between plan sponsors and asset managers lead to portfolio misallocation that systematically reduces beneficiary returns, with implications for the design of fiduciary standards in retirement savings markets.